A Theory of the State

Теория государства: экономические права, юридические права и пределы государства
Yoram Barzel
2001-12-03

enforcement mechanismslegal rightsprotector-rulerrule of lawstate emergence
This book models the emergence of the state, and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals will install a ruler only after they create a mechanism to control him. Among the offshoots of the organized protection are legal system and decision-making procedures that include voting. The initial 'state of nature' may gradually evolve into a rule-of-law state. The state endows individuals with rights by delineating what it will protect. Enforcement, however, is never perfect. People use third parties such as firms to enforce agreements. As commodities become standardized, scale economies increase. In order to exploit the economies of within-state enforcement, the state will expand the contact enforcement territory by treaty or by conquest. The force may explain the creation of rule-of-law empires.
1
As commodities standardize and scale economies grow, within-state enforcement becomes more valuable.
2
Individuals install a ruler only after creating mechanisms to control the ruler due to his self-seeking incentives.
3
Organized protection gives rise to legal systems and collective decision procedures such as voting.
4
State expansion and centralized enforcement can explain the historical emergence of rule-of-law empires.
5
State formation is driven by protection needs and the efficiency of a specialized protector-ruler.
6
The initial state of nature can gradually evolve into a rule-of-law state through these institutional developments.
7
The state defines individuals' rights by specifying what it will protect, but enforcement is inherently imperfect.
8
Third parties (e.g., firms) are used by people to enforce agreements when state enforcement is incomplete.
9
To exploit enforcement economies of scale, the state expands its enforcement territory via treaties or conquest.

The state as an emergent institution of organized protection (including protector-ruler, legal system, and decision-making procedures)

How economic rights, legal rights, enforcement imperfections, control mechanisms over rulers, and scale economies in third-party/within-state enforcement shape the emergence, expansion, and evolution (toward rule-of-law) of the state

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2001-12-03
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Yoram Barzel
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