Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000
Конкуренция за капитал: распространение двусторонних инвестиционных договоров, 1960–2000 гг.
2006-10-01
SCID: 54.1/37q82z6b
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bilateral investment treatieseconomic competitionforeign direct investmentinternational arbitrationtreaty diffusion
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Abstract (AI)
Over the past forty-five years, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment. The proliferation of BITs during the past two decades in particular has been phenomenal. These intergovernmental treaties typically grant extensive rights to foreign investors, including protection of contractual rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute. How can we explain the widespread adoption of BITs? We argue that the spread of BITs is driven by international competition among potential host countries—typically developing countries—for foreign direct investment. We propose a set of hypotheses that derive from such an explanation and develop a set of empirical tests that rely on network measures of economic competition as well as more indirect evidence of competitive pressures on the host to sign BITs. The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done so. We find some evidence that coercion and learning play a role, but less support for cultural explanations based on emulation. Our main finding is that the diffusion of BITs is associated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign investment. We are agnostic at this point about the benefits of this competition for development.
Key Findings
1
Coercion and learning appear to contribute to BIT diffusion, while cultural emulation receives comparatively little support.
2
Network-based measures of economic competition and indirect evidence support competitive pressures as drivers of BIT adoption.
3
Potential host countries were more likely to sign BITs when their economic competitors had already concluded such treaties.
4
The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties from 1960–2000 was primarily driven by competition among developing countries to attract foreign direct investment.
5
The study does not determine whether competition to attract foreign investment through BITs benefits economic development.
Research Object
The diffusion and adoption of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) by developing countries competing to attract foreign direct investment, 1960–2000
Research Subject
The role of international competitive economic pressures among potential host countries in driving BIT adoption and diffusion, including the effects of coercion, learning, and emulation
Publication Details
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2006-10-01
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