Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Проблемы агентства и теория фирмы
1980-04-01
SCID: 54.1/3e9uyxtm
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agency problemscorporate governancemarket for managerial servicesmonitoring mechanismsseparation of ownership and control
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Abstract (AI)
This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. We first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur--management and risk bearing--are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devides for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm.
Key Findings
1
Corporations need not be interpreted as having meaningful 'owners' for the purposes of analyzing large modern firms.
2
Entrepreneurial functions of management and risk-bearing are distinct and separable within firm contracts.
3
Firms evolve devices for efficiently monitoring both team performance and individual members due to competitive discipline.
4
Managers and other participants are disciplined and incentivized by internal and external markets for their services.
5
Separation of security ownership and control in large corporations can be an efficient economic organization.
Research Object
The firm as a contractual economic organization (large modern corporation characterized by separation of ownership and control)
Research Subject
How separation of security ownership and control, and the allocation of management and risk-bearing across contracts, governs monitoring, incentives, and efficiency of the firm under competition
Publication Details
Publication Date
1980-04-01
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