Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Проектирование информации: единый взгляд
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
2019-03-01

Bayesian persuasioncommunication in gamesgames of incomplete informationinformation designinformation structure
Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information. ( JEL C70, D82, D83)
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Information design studies how providing information alone can influence players' behavior in games with uncertain payoffs.
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The literal and metaphorical interpretations unify a large body of work, including communication in games, Bayesian persuasion, and recent robust-prediction results in incomplete-information games.
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The paper provides an introduction to key issues and insights of the rapidly growing information design literature, highlighting its unifying perspective.
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There are two interpretations: literal (a committed information designer chooses an information structure) and metaphorical (analyst uses information design to characterize play under many information structures).

Information design problem in games with uncertain payoffs (choice of information structures for participants)

How provision and choice of information structures influence players' behavior and unify literatures on communication in games, Bayesian persuasion, and robust predictions in games of incomplete information

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2019-03-01
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Dirk Bergemann
Stephen Morris
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