Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy
Горизонтальные слияния и антимонопольная политика
1992-06-01
SCID: 54.1/6zx4sfg3
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Cournot-Nash modelantitrust policyhorizontal mergersmarket concentrationwelfare implications
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Abstract (AI)
The welfare implications of horizontal mergers are examined in the context of the Cournot-Nash model of M. Perry and R. Porter (1985). Horizontal mergers are more likely to be welfare enhancing the more concentrated is the ownership of the nonmerging firms. Mergers that create a new largest firm, or increase the size of the largest firm, reduce welfare. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Key Findings
1
Horizontal mergers are more likely to improve welfare when ownership among nonmerging firms is more concentrated.
2
Mergers that create a new largest firm reduce welfare.
3
Mergers that increase the size of the existing largest firm reduce welfare.
4
The welfare effects of horizontal mergers are analyzed using the Cournot–Nash model developed by Perry and Porter (1985).
Research Object
horizontal mergers in Cournot-Nash oligopoly markets
Research Subject
the welfare effects of horizontal mergers as a function of nonmerging-firm ownership concentration and changes in the size of the largest firm
Publication Details
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1992-06-01
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