Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical

Атаки по побочным каналам на кэш последнего уровня практично осуществимы
Gernot Heiser, Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Ruby B. Lee
2015-05-01

GnuPGPrime+Probecross-VM attacklast-level cacheside-channel attack
We present an effective implementation of the Prime+Probe side-channel attack against the last-level cache. We measure the capacity of the covert channel the attack creates and demonstrate a cross-core, cross-VM attack on multiple versions of GnuPG. Our technique achieves a high attack resolution without relying on weaknesses in the OS or virtual machine monitor or on sharing memory between attacker and victim.
1
A cross-core, cross-virtual-machine attack is demonstrated against multiple GnuPG versions.
2
The attack creates a measurable covert channel with high resolution.
3
The attack does not require operating-system or virtual-machine-monitor weaknesses, nor memory sharing between attacker and victim.
4
The paper presents an effective Prime+Probe implementation targeting the last-level cache.
5
The results show that last-level cache side-channel attacks are practical in realistic isolation settings.

Last-level CPU cache (as exploited by Prime+Probe side-channel attacks)

the practicality, covert-channel capacity, and attack resolution of Prime+Probe side-channel attacks against the last-level cache

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Publication Date
2015-05-01
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Authors
Gernot Heiser
Fangfei Liu
Yuval Yarom
Qian Ge
Ruby B. Lee
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