The Balkan Front During the Russo-Turkish Wars of the 19th Century: A Perspective from the Ottoman Side

The paper analyses the influence of the military reforms on the battle effectiveness of the Ottoman army on the Balkan front during the Russo-Turkish wars of 1828—1829, 1877—1878 and the Crimean war of 1853—1856. The paper scrutinizes the performance of the Ottoman military along with the key factors that contributed to the outcome of the Russo-Turkish wars. A diverse array of hitherto understudied Ottoman sources, encompassing the works of military leaders and historians, together with the writings of the Russian officers, affords the opportunity to include the course of events of wars between the Ottoman and Russian empires into a wider context of the transformation of the Ottoman military and draw several conclusions concerning its results. Throughout the century, the Ottoman sultans were actively transforming the army, implementing changes that affected all aspects of its life, from the organizational structure to the basics of the military education. However, a multifaceted analysis of conflicts with Russia revealed that the pace of transformation was insufficient, leading to several military defeats of the Ottoman empire. The primary reasons for these outcomes lay in the Ottoman military command’s approach to operational planning. In the absence of a well-developed strategy the Ottoman empire was only able to conduct passive defense. The wars of 1828—1829 and 1877—1878 clearly demonstrated that the Russian army cleared this defense within a short time. Au contraire, the active defense carried out by the Sublime Porte during the Crimean war, resulted in a number of tactical successes on the Balkans. At the same time, technological superiority and military strength have not played a decisive role in the outcome of these wars.