The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November

Recent studies of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis have relied heavily on remarkable declassified U.S. sources, but these have obviously not sufficed to produce a rigorous international history. Access to Soviet, Cuban, and other non-U.S. sources has been temporary, arbitrary, limited, or forbidden—prohibiting a full understanding of Soviet and Cuban actions and, thus, preventing a study of the missile crisis as a whole. Such an unfortunate situation renders this book a major contribution. It really comprises two works. First, it is the account of early Soviet relations with Fidel Castro's Cuba, especially the difficult aftermath of the missile crisis, through the eyes of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's deputy and diplomatic troubleshooter, Anastas Mikoyan. Mikoyan did not live long enough to write his own account, so his son Sergo (his father's personal secretary during the crisis) is a substitute. Anastas had been instrumental in establishing Soviet-Cuban ties in early 1960. Thus, he was the obvious choice to smooth things over when Khrushchev agreed to settle the crisis by removing Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba. Khrushchev did so without consulting the Cuban leadership, which reacted with understandable outrage.