Guns and Butter: Stability and Robustness
Оружие и масло: стабильность и устойчивость
2020-04-01
SCID: 54.1/b6kgdxv7
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Cobb-Douglas utilityanarchic systemcontest modelresource allocationstable equilibrium
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Abstract (AI)
abstract The paper considers the problem of allocating resources to economic goods and military goods (protecting property rights) in a contest model under an anarchic system which can be defined by the absence of a common superior authority to each state. I characterize the equilibrium and discuss its stability and robustness. The main finding is that if economic goods of the two states are complementary with Cobb-Douglas utility characteristics, the essential factor that affects a state’s resource allocation is its own maximum military level of production out of its resource endowment. In this sense, there is a unique stable equilibrium. This equilibrium is robust with the sequence of the states’ decisions insofar as the second mover’s observability is imperfect even slightly.
Key Findings
1
The equilibrium remains robust to the sequence of state decisions when the second mover’s observability is even slightly imperfect.
2
The paper characterizes equilibrium resource allocation between economic goods and military goods in an anarchic two-state contest model.
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Under these conditions, the model has a unique stable equilibrium.
4
With complementary economic goods represented by Cobb-Douglas utility, each state’s allocation is primarily determined by its maximum military production from its resource endowment.
Research Object
Resource allocation between economic goods and military goods by two states in an anarchic contest model
Research Subject
The equilibrium’s stability and robustness, and the determinants of states’ resource-allocation decisions under complementary economic goods and imperfect observability
Publication Details
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2020-04-01
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