Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War
Спотыкающийся колосс: Красная армия накануне мировой войны
1999-01-01
SCID: 54.1/edh84sps
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Nazi GermanyOperation BarbarossaRed ArmySoviet military weaknessStalin preemptive strike
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Abstract (AI)
in 1941, David Glantz discusses Soviet lack of preparation for Operation Barbarossa, and explains how the Soviets almost lost the Second World War that year.Glantz also argues that, because of Soviet military weakness in 1941, accusing Stalin of planning a preemptive strike on Nazi Germany that year is untenable.I enjoyed the book overall, but find his description of what happened to be stronger, partly unavoidably, than his argument about what could or could not have happened.The Soviet colossus was stumbling, butwas it backward or forward?The answer seems to be "backward," but I had to look elsewhere for confirmation of that additional thesis.
Key Findings
1
David Glantz argues that the Soviet Union was poorly prepared for Operation Barbarossa in 1941 and consequently nearly lost World War II that year.
2
The abstract states that Soviet military weakness in 1941 makes the claim that Stalin planned a preemptive attack on Nazi Germany untenable.
3
The reviewer characterizes the Soviet military colossus as stumbling backward rather than progressing, while noting that this broader thesis requires confirmation from other sources.
4
The work provides a stronger account of what happened to the Red Army than of hypothetical alternative outcomes or what might have occurred.
Research Object
the Soviet Red Army on the eve of World War II, particularly in 1941
Research Subject
Soviet military preparedness and weakness in 1941, including the implications for the alleged plan to launch a preemptive strike on Nazi Germany
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1999-01-01
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