Subnational Budget Rules: Foreign and Russian Experience
Бюджетные правила субнационального уровня: зарубежный и российский опыт
2018-01-01
SCID: 54.1/eevjdqq9
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fiscal disciplinefiscal sustainabilityregional public debtsubnational budget rulestransfer dependence
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Abstract (AI)
The article discusses the rules and restrictions for subnational budgets in Russia and some federative countries, as well as the current level of debt burden of the respective public authority. According to the authors, in the world practice, modern budget rules for the regions are characterized by flexible built-in mechanisms that allow them to adapt quickly to external and internal shocks without making changes in their basic design. This ensures not only fiscal sustainability of public finances at the regional level, but also stability of budget legislation and its law enforcement practice. The authors analyze the arguments pro and contra the application of conditional budget rules, that is, the features of binding certain restrictions of budget parameters (volume of expenditures, regional budget deficit, public debt) to such criteria as the level of transfer dependence, the amount of accumulated debt level, the dynamics of GRP growth rates etc. The analysis of international and Russian practice has led to the conclusion that budgetary rules should not be differentiated based on the level of transfer dependence, that there is a need for tighter restrictions for regions with high debt burden, and that budget rules should be given sufficient flexibility. In order to ensure effective application of new budget rules, the authors propose limiting the practice of making decisions at the federal level that directly affect the expenditure obligations of the regions, and introducing a system of built-in mechanisms to increase fiscal discipline, including encouraging regions that implement responsible fiscal policies and applying sanctions for violating budget rules.
Key Findings
1
Budget rules should not be differentiated according to regions’ levels of transfer dependence.
2
Conditional budget rules may link expenditure, deficit, and debt restrictions to transfer dependence, accumulated debt, or regional GRP growth dynamics.
3
Effective enforcement requires limiting federal decisions that impose expenditure obligations on regions and introducing incentives and sanctions to strengthen fiscal discipline.
4
Modern subnational budget rules in federations use flexible built-in mechanisms to adapt to internal and external shocks without redesigning the rules.
5
Regions with high debt burdens require stricter fiscal restrictions, while the overall budget framework should retain sufficient flexibility.
Research Object
Subnational budget rules and fiscal conditions in Russian regions and selected federative countries
Research Subject
The flexibility, conditional restrictions, debt-burden dependence, and fiscal-discipline effects of subnational budget rules
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2018-01-01
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