The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets

Цена регулирования гарантий занятости: данные рынков труда стран Латинской Америки
James J. Heckman, Carmen Pagés
2000-01-01

Latin American labor marketsjob security regulationlabor market regulationmandated benefitssocial security programs
overnments introduce labor market regulations with the stated objective of improving workers' welfare. Mandated benefits and social security programs improve workers' income security in case of sickness, work accidents, and old age. Job security provisions are designed to reduce a worker's odds of losing her job and her means of living. But, as is often true in economics, benefits usually come at a cost: mandated benefits may reduce employment; job security provisions may protect some workers at the expense of others.
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Job security provisions are intended to reduce workers’ probability of job loss and protect their livelihoods.
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Labor market regulations aim to improve workers’ welfare through mandated benefits, social security, and job security provisions.
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Mandated benefits and social security programs increase income security during sickness, workplace accidents, and old age.
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The abstract emphasizes potential trade-offs: mandated benefits may reduce employment, while job security protections may benefit some workers at the expense of others.
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The paper investigates the costs of job security regulation using evidence from Latin American labor markets.

Latin American labor markets under job security regulation

The employment and distributional costs of job security provisions, including reduced employment and protection of some workers at the expense of others

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2000-01-01
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James J. Heckman
Carmen Pagés
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