Putting the "Con" into Constitutions: The Economics of Prison Gangs
Встраивая «мошенничество» в конституции: экономика тюремных банд
2008-11-07
SCID: 54.1/hw3qkgpq
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La Nuestra Familiacollective action problemscriminal enterprise governanceprison gangswritten constitution
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Abstract (AI)
This paper investigates the internal governance institutions of criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of the La Nuestra Familia prison gang. To organize effectively within the confines of penitentiaries, the gang needs to provide a credible commitment for member safety to potential entrants and a means of preventing predation and misconduct within the gang. I analyze the governance structure outlined in the gang's written constitution and show how it solves the collective action problems associated with multilevel criminal enterprises. (JEL D23, K42, L23, P16)
Key Findings
1
Internal rules address collective-action problems by preventing predation and misconduct among gang members.
2
La Nuestra Familia’s written constitution establishes internal governance institutions that help organize a multilevel criminal enterprise within prisons.
3
The gang’s governance structure provides credible commitments to member safety, encouraging potential entrants to join despite operating in penitentiaries.
4
The paper applies economic and organizational analysis to explain how formal constitutional rules support governance in a criminal enterprise.
Research Object
La Nuestra Familia prison gang and its internal governance institutions
Research Subject
The governance structure and credible-commitment mechanisms that address member safety, internal predation and misconduct, and collective-action problems in a multilevel criminal enterprise
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2008-11-07
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