Epistemic Rationality: Not (Just) Instrumental
Эпистемическая рациональность: не (только) инструментальная
2019-10-01
SCID: 54.1/j4vvprnx
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categorical normativityepistemic normativityepistemic rationalityevidence and beliefinstrumental rationality
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Abstract (AI)
Abstract Many epistemologists and philosophers of science, especially those with “naturalist” inclinations, argue that if there is to be any such thing as normativity or rationality in these domains, it must be instrumental—roughly, a matter of goal satisfaction—rather than something involving normative “oughts” that are independent of the satisfaction of our epistemic, cognitive, or other ends. This paper argues that while such an instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is perfectly respectable, even insofar as it concerns specifically epistemic ends, it cannot be the whole story about such normativity. Rather, it must be accompanied by a “categorical,” goal‐independent sort of normativity that cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality, both because instrumental rationality itself depends on a noninstrumental relationship between a belief/claim/theory and the evidence that renders it rational, and because the epistemic rationality of many beliefs is independent of the goals of their believers.
Key Findings
1
A complete account of epistemic rationality must combine instrumental rationality with irreducible categorical normativity.
2
Instrumental epistemic rationality is a legitimate form of normativity, including when directed toward specifically epistemic goals.
3
Instrumental rationality cannot fully explain epistemic normativity because it presupposes a noninstrumental relation between beliefs, claims, or theories and the evidence supporting them.
4
Many beliefs are epistemically rational independently of the goals held by the believers, requiring a categorical, goal-independent form of normativity.
Research Object
epistemic rationality and normativity
Research Subject
the relationship between instrumental, goal-dependent rationality and categorical, goal-independent epistemic normativity, including the evidential grounding of beliefs, claims, and theories
Publication Details
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2019-10-01
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