The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution

Целостность коррумпированных государств: взяточничество как неформальный государственный институт
Keith A. Darden
2008-02-15

administrative hierarchiescorrupt statescross-national analysisinformal state institutionsofficial graft
This article argues that corrupt practices such as bribery and embezzlement, which scholars have previously assumed to be evidence of the breakdown of the state, may reinforce the state's administrative hierarchies under certain conditions. Drawing on a cross-national analysis of 132 countries and a detailed examination of the informal institutions of official graft in Ukraine, the article finds that where graft is systematically tracked, monitored, and granted by state leaders as an informal payment in exchange for compliance, it provides both an added incentive to obey leaders' directives and the potent sanction of criminal prosecution in the event of disobedience. Where graft is informally institutionalized in this way, it provides the basis for state organizations that are effective at collecting taxes, maintaining public order, and repressing political opposition but that may undermine the development of liberal politics.
1
Corrupt practices such as bribery and embezzlement can reinforce, rather than signal the breakdown of, state administrative hierarchies under certain conditions.
2
Cross-national analysis of 132 countries and a detailed study of Ukraine show that systematically monitored and leader-sanctioned graft can become an informal state institution.
3
Institutionalized graft incentivizes officials to obey leaders’ directives while enabling criminal prosecution as a sanction for disobedience.
4
States with institutionalized graft may effectively collect taxes, maintain public order, and repress political opposition, while undermining the development of liberal politics.

Informal state institutions of official graft, including bribery and embezzlement, in states and state organizations (with a detailed case study of Ukraine)

How the systematic tracking, monitoring, and leader-granted institutionalization of graft reinforces administrative hierarchies, induces compliance, and shapes state organizational effectiveness and liberal political development

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2008-02-15
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Keith A. Darden
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