The Politics of Free Trade Agreements

Политическая экономия соглашений о свободной торговле
Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman
1993-12-01

free trade agreementsincumbent governmentindustry special interest groupspolitical economypolitically sensitive sectors
Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA).Will an FTA between these countries be politically viable?And if so, what form will it take?We address these questions using a political-economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry special interest groups and an incumbent government.We describe the economic conditions necessary for an FTA to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and when a few, politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreement.
1
It identifies the economic conditions under which negotiating countries can sustain an FTA as a political equilibrium.
2
Politically sensitive industries can shape the form of an FTA by motivating exclusions rather than preventing the agreement entirely.
3
The analysis distinguishes between agreements covering all bilateral trade and agreements allowing politically sensitive sectors to be excluded.
4
The paper develops a political-economy framework in which industry special interests and an incumbent government jointly determine FTA outcomes.

free trade agreements between two countries

political viability and equilibrium form of FTAs, including the conditions under which bilateral trade coverage or exclusion of politically sensitive sectors is sustainable

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1993-12-01
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Gene M. Grossman
Elhanan Helpman
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