Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions

Эпистемическая справедливость как добродетель социальных институтов
Elizabeth Anderson
2012-04-01

epistemic justicehermeneutical justicesocial epistemologysocial institutionstestimonial justice
In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual transactions that cannot be controlled at the individual or institutional levels. This is true not only with respect to the overall distribution of such goods as income and wealth, but also with respect to the goods of testimonial and hermeneutical justice. Cognitive biases that may be difficult for even epistemically virtuous individuals to correct on their own may be more susceptible to correction if we focus on the principles that should govern our systems of testimonial gathering and assessment. Hence, while Fricker’s focus on individual epistemic virtue is important, we also need to consider what epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems would require. My paper will indicate some directions forward on this front, focusing on the need for integration of diverse institutions and persons engaged in inquiry.
1
A systemic perspective can address cumulative testimonial and hermeneutical injustices produced by millions of individual transactions.
2
Achieving social-systemic epistemic justice requires greater integration among diverse institutions and persons engaged in inquiry.
3
Epistemic justice should be assessed not only in interpersonal exchanges and individual institutions, but also across integrated systems of institutions.
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Institutional principles governing testimonial gathering and assessment may correct cognitive biases that even epistemically virtuous individuals cannot overcome alone.
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The paper extends Fricker’s focus on individual epistemic virtue by framing epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems.

social systems and institutions involved in testimonial and hermeneutical knowledge practices

epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems, including principles for testimonial gathering and assessment and the integration of diverse institutions and inquirers

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2012-04-01
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Elizabeth Anderson
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