Deposit Insurance Database

База данных по страхованию депозитов
Asli Demirgà ⁄ ç-Kunt, Edward J. Kane, Luc Laeven
2014-07-01

Safety Net Indexdeposit insuranceglobal databasegovernment guaranteesmoral hazard
This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
1
A Safety Net Index measures the generosity of deposit insurance schemes and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets.
2
Although most crisis-era guarantees were formally removed, deposit-insurance coverage remained above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and future moral hazard.
3
Deposit insurance became more widespread and coverage more extensive after the global financial crisis, while protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets temporarily increased.
4
The dataset extends earlier work by adding recent deposit-insurance adopters and information on guarantees covering banks’ assets and liabilities.
5
The paper provides a comprehensive global database of deposit insurance arrangements and government guarantees as of 2013.

Global deposit insurance arrangements and government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities as of 2013

The extent, generosity, evolution, and post-crisis coverage of deposit insurance and government guarantees, including implications for implicit coverage and moral hazard

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2014-07-01
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Authors
Asli Demirgà ⁄ ç-Kunt
Edward J. Kane
Luc Laeven
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