environmental diplomacyenvironmental treaty-makingnearly self-enforcing agreementsnon-governmental interestssustainable development
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Abstract (AI)
Abstract Lawrence Susskind looks at the weaknesses of the existing system of environmental treaty-making and the increasing role of non-governmental interests in environmental diplomacy. He argues for ‘nearly self-enforcing’ agreements that ensure compliance without threatening sovereignty and maintains that new institutional arrangements are within reach. Susskind builds on the work of the Program on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School and the International Environmental Negotiation Network to offer guidelines for more effecitve global agreements that provide for sustainable development.
Key Findings
1
Advocates for 'nearly self-enforcing' agreements that ensure compliance without threatening state sovereignty.
2
Existing system of environmental treaty-making has significant weaknesses that hinder effective outcomes.
3
Guidelines are proposed (based on Program on Negotiation and International Environmental Negotiation Network) for more effective global agreements that support sustainable development.
4
New institutional arrangements for environmental diplomacy are feasible and achievable.
5
Non-governmental interests are playing an increasing role in environmental diplomacy.
Research Object
Existing system of environmental treaty-making and related institutional arrangements for environmental diplomacy
Research Subject
Weaknesses and reform strategies for achieving nearly self-enforcing agreements, compliance mechanisms that respect sovereignty, and institutional arrangements to enable effective global environmental agreements for sustainable development
Publication Details
Publication Date
1994-02-17
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