The Macroeconomics of Child Labor Regulation
Макроэкономика регулирования детского труда
2005-11-01
SCID: 54.1/s26f9465
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child labor regulationfertility decisionspolitical economyskill-biased technological changewage inequality
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Abstract (AI)
We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban, unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income. Fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill-biased technological change, which induces parents to choose smaller families. The theory can account for the observation that, in Britain, regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapid fertility decline.
Key Findings
1
Fertility choices create persistent political preferences over child labor regulation and can generate multiple steady-state outcomes.
2
Skill-biased technological change can trigger child labor laws by encouraging parents to choose smaller families.
3
The theory explains Britain’s initial child labor regulations as following rising wage inequality and coinciding with rapid fertility decline.
4
Workers competing with children generally support child labor bans, except when their own working children contribute substantially to household income.
Research Object
child labor regulation and the affected workers and families
Research Subject
the macroeconomic and political determinants of adopting child labor laws, including fertility choices, family-income dependence on children’s work, technological change, wage inequality, and fertility decline
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2005-11-01
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