Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness

Торговля, демократия и размер государственного сектора: политические основы открытости
Carles Boix, Alı́cia Adserà
2002-01-01

authoritarian regimescompensation policiespolitical-economic equilibriapublic sector sizetrade openness
Politics remains prominently absent in the literature showing that higher levels of trade integration lead to a larger public sector. As openness increases, the state, acting as a social planner, adopts a salient role to minimize the risks of economic integration and secure social peace. Given the highly redistributive nature of both trade and fiscal policies, we claim, however, that the interaction of the international economy and domestic politics leads to three distinct political-economic equilibria. First, nations may embrace protectionist policies to shore up the welfare of key domestic sectors—without engaging, therefore, in substantial public spending. Second, to maintain trade openness in democracies, policymakers develop compensation policies to muster the support of the losers of openness. Finally, given the tax burden of public compensation, pro-free trade sectors may impose an authoritarian regime to exclude (instead of buying off) their opponents. After formally stating the conditions under which each regime emerges, we test the model on a panel data of around sixty-five developing and developed nations in the period 1950–1990 and explore its implications through a set of key historical cases drawn from the last two centuries.
1
Democracies maintain free trade by developing compensation policies that secure support from groups losing from international economic integration.
2
The model identifies three political-economic equilibria: protectionism with limited public spending, democratic openness supported by compensatory redistribution, and authoritarian openness that excludes opponents.
3
The paper argues that the relationship between trade openness and public-sector size is shaped by domestic political conditions, not solely by economic integration.
4
The proposed conditions are tested using panel data from approximately 65 developed and developing countries during 1950–1990, alongside historical case studies spanning two centuries.
5
When compensating opponents becomes too costly, pro-free-trade sectors may impose authoritarian rule rather than finance redistribution.

The interaction between international trade openness and domestic political regimes in nations

Political-economic equilibria linking trade openness, regime type, protectionism, and compensatory public spending

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2002-01-01
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Carles Boix
Alı́cia Adserà
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