Corruption and the Rate of Temptation
Коррупция и уровень искушения
1997-06-01
SCID: 54.1/w6zn2ecu
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bribescivil service corruptiondeveloping countriesefficiency wage modelsfair wage models
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Abstract (AI)
This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.
Key Findings
1
Cross-country evidence from developing countries indicates a negative relationship between civil-service wages and corruption.
2
Empirical tests do not conclusively distinguish between the fair-wage and shirking efficiency-wage models.
3
Fair-wage models predict that civil-service wages are an important determinant of corruption, whereas shirking models assign wages a secondary role because bribes can vastly exceed wage income.
4
The paper develops and tests two efficiency-wage models explaining corruption in the civil service.
Research Object
civil service corruption in developing countries
Research Subject
the relationship between civil service wages and corruption, and the validity of fair-wage versus shirking efficiency-wage models
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Publication Date
1997-06-01
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