Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Сознание, доступность и взаимосвязь психологии и нейронауки
2007-12-01
SCID: 54.1/3pzex262
Discuss with AI
Fodorian modulescognitive accessibilityneural basisneural overflowphenomenal consciousness
Figures from the paper
Abstract (AI)
How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.
Key Findings
1
A neural realizer of consciousness overflow can be identified if cognitive-access mechanisms are excluded from the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness, an assumption supported by the explanatory benefits it enables.
2
Empirical data are presented as showing that phenomenal consciousness can overflow cognitive accessibility in a specific sense.
3
Including reportability mechanisms within the neural basis of clear conscious cases would preclude phenomenal consciousness in Fodorian modules, but the methodology cannot independently determine whether this inclusion is justified.
4
The paper argues for an abstract solution that separates the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural basis of cognitive accessibility.
5
The paper identifies a methodological circularity in distinguishing neural bases of phenomenal consciousness from neural mechanisms enabling reports of consciousness.
Research Object
neural basis of phenomenal consciousness and cognitive accessibility, including representations within Fodorian modules
Research Subject
the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive accessibility, specifically whether phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility and how this overflow can be neurally realized
Publication Details
Publication Date
2007-12-01
Journal
Publisher
ISSN
Cited by
1205
Access Type
Author Information
Download PDF
Subscribe to digest