Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China

Федерализм по-китайски: политические основы экономического успеха Китая
Gabriella R. Montinola, Barry R. Weingast, Yingyi Qian
1995-10-01

Chinese-style federalismcredible commitment to marketseconomic experimentationinstitutionalized decentralizationlocal government competition
China's remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets. This reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call “federalism, Chinese style.” This form of decentralization has three consequences. First, it fosters competition, not only in product markets, but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital. This competition, in turn, encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises, regulation, and economic relationships. Second, it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity. Finally, it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government.
1
China’s economic success is grounded partly in political reform that provides credible commitment to market-oriented activity.
2
Decentralization creates competition among local governments for markets, labor, and foreign capital, encouraging experimentation and policy learning.
3
Local autonomy gives governments incentives to promote local economic prosperity and develop new enterprises and regulatory arrangements.
4
The paper identifies “federalism, Chinese style” as institutionalized decentralization underpinning China’s economic development.
5
The system protects local governments and their enterprises from central political interference, supporting stable local economic initiatives.

China's institutionalized decentralization system termed 'federalism, Chinese style'

The effects of “federalism, Chinese style” on credible market commitment, intergovernmental competition, local experimentation and learning, incentives for economic prosperity, and protection from central political intervention

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1995-10-01
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Authors
Gabriella R. Montinola
Barry R. Weingast
Yingyi Qian
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