Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Институты, институциональные изменения и экономическая результативность
1991-07-01
SCID: 54.1/fzwxbfay
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economic performanceentrepreneurial perceptioninstitutional changeinstitutionstransaction costs
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Abstract (AI)
Examines the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time. Institutions are separate from organizations, which are assemblages of people directed to strategically operating within institutional constraints. Institutions affect the economy by influencing, together with technology, transaction and production costs. They do this by reducing uncertainty in human interaction, albeit not always efficiently. Entrepreneurs accomplish incremental changes in institutions by perceiving opportunities to do better through altering the institutional framework of political and economic organizations. Importantly, the ability to perceive these opportunities depends on both the completeness of information and the mental constructs used to process that information. Thus, institutions and entrepreneurs stand in a symbiotic relationship where each gives feedback to the other. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient institutions ought to be rapidly replaced. This symbiotic relationship helps explain why this theoretical consequence is often not observed: while this relationship allows growth, it also allows inefficient institutions to persist. The author identifies changes in relative prices and prevailing ideas as the source of institutional alterations. Transaction costs, however, may keep relative price changes from being fully exploited. Transaction costs are influenced by institutions and institutional development is accordingly path-dependent. (CAR)
Key Findings
1
Entrepreneurs drive incremental institutional change by perceiving opportunities to alter political and economic institutional frameworks, with perception depending on information completeness and mental constructs.
2
Institutional development is path-dependent because transaction costs—affected by existing institutions—can prevent full exploitation of relative price changes and prevailing ideas that would otherwise prompt institutional change.
3
Institutions differ from organizations; organizations strategically operate within institutional constraints while institutions reduce uncertainty in human interaction, not always efficiently.
4
Institutions, defined as humanly devised constraints, shape economic performance by influencing transaction and production costs alongside technology.
5
The symbiotic feedback between institutions and entrepreneurs explains both economic growth and the persistence of inefficient institutions, contrary to neoclassical expectations of rapid replacement.
Research Object
Institutions (humanly devised constraints shaping human interaction) and their change over time
Research Subject
How institutions influence economic performance and the dynamics/mechanisms of institutional change (including role of transaction and production costs, entrepreneurs' role, information and ideas, path dependence)
Publication Details
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1991-07-01
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