Nice Guys Finish First: The Competitive Altruism Hypothesis
Хорошие парни финишируют первыми: гипотеза конкурентного альтруизма
2006-09-08
SCID: 54.1/qrwqs9kz
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Altruistic behaviorCompetitive altruismReputation effectsSocial dilemmaStatus hierarchies
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Abstract (AI)
Three experimental studies examined the relationship between altruistic behavior and the emergence of status hierarchies within groups. In each study, group members were confronted with a social dilemma in which they could either benefit themselves or their group. Study 1 revealed that in a reputation environment when contributions were public, people were more altruistic. In both Studies 1 and 2, the most altruistic members gained the highest status in their group and were most frequently preferred as cooperative interaction partners. Study 3 showed that as the costs of altruism increase, the status rewards also increase. These results support the premise at the heart of competitive altruism: Individuals may behave altruistically for reputation reasons because selective benefits (associated with status) accrue to the generous.
Key Findings
1
As the costs of altruism increase, the status rewards for altruistic behavior also increase (Study 3).
2
Findings support competitive altruism: individuals act altruistically for reputation because status-linked selective benefits accrue to the generous.
3
Most altruistic individuals are most frequently preferred as cooperative interaction partners (Studies 1 and 2).
4
The most altruistic group members attain the highest status within their groups (Studies 1 and 2).
5
When contributions are public in a reputation environment, people behave more altruistically (Study 1).
Research Object
Group members participating in social dilemma experiments
Research Subject
Relationship between individual altruistic behavior and emergence/allocation of status and partner preferences within groups (competitive altruism and reputation-driven status rewards, including cost-dependent effects)
Publication Details
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2006-09-08
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