Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility

Опрос свободы: народные интуиции о свободе воли и моральной ответственности
Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Turner
2005-10-01

deterministic scenariosexperimental philosophyfolk intuitionsfree willmoral responsibility
Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of surveying people's prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research.
1
In the same two studies, a majority of participants judged agents in deterministic scenarios to be morally responsible for their actions.
2
In two studies, a majority of participants judged agents in deterministic scenarios to act of their own free will.
3
The authors acknowledge various methodological difficulties and limitations inherent in surveying prephilosophical judgments about free will and responsibility.
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The paper discusses philosophical implications of these results for the free will debate, including claims that opposing philosophical views appeal to folk intuitions.
5
Using experimental philosophy methods, the authors surveyed folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in deterministic scenarios.

Folk participants' intuitions/judgments about agents' freedom and moral responsibility in deterministic scenarios

Prephilosophical judgments about whether agents in deterministic scenarios act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions

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2005-10-01
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Eddy Nahmias
Stephen G. Morris
Thomas Nadelhoffer
Jason Turner
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