Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
Федерализм как обязательство по сохранению рыночных стимулов
1997-11-01
SCID: 54.1/xsgutha3
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credible commitmentdecentralization of authorityfederalisminterjurisdictional competitionmarket incentives
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Abstract (AI)
The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures. The salient features of federalism--decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition--help provide credible commitment or these purposes. In addition, the authors suggest that some federalism are self-sustaining.
Key Findings
1
Federalism’s decentralization of information and authority, together with interjurisdictional competition, supports credible commitment to market incentives.
2
Market incentives are preserved when the state is credibly constrained from undermining future economic success or bailing out future failures.
3
Some federal arrangements may become self-sustaining because their institutional features reinforce continued commitment to preserving market incentives.
4
The paper conceptualizes federalism as a state governance solution for credibly preserving market incentives.
Research Object
Federalism as a governance arrangement
Research Subject
How federalism credibly preserves market incentives by preventing commitment failures, including future policy compromises and bailouts, through decentralization, interjurisdictional competition, and self-sustaining mechanisms
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1997-11-01
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