Tipping and Concentration in Markets with Indirect Network Effects

Эффект вытеснения и концентрация на рынках с косвенными сетевыми эффектами
Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Jean‐Pierre Dubé, Günter J. Hitsch
2010-02-17

dynamic standards competitionindirect network effectsmarket concentrationpenetration pricingvideo game consoles
This paper develops a framework for measuring “tipping”—the increase in a firm's market share dominance caused by indirect network effects. Our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects. In practice, this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects. We build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware/software paradigm. To demonstrate its applicability, we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32/64-bit generation of video game consoles, a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects. In our example, we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong, economically significant increase in market concentration. We also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side, as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war, and on the supply side, as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks.
1
A dynamic standards-competition model for hardware and software predicts counterfactual concentration under varying strengths of indirect network effects.
2
Calibration to data from the 32/64-bit video game console generation shows that indirect network effects can substantially and economically significantly increase market concentration.
3
Consumer expectations influence demand because consumers tend to choose products they expect to win the standards war.
4
Firm expectations influence supply strategies, leading firms to use penetration pricing to invest in expanding their networks.
5
The paper introduces a measure of market tipping that compares expected concentration with counterfactual concentration absent indirect network effects.

Dynamic standards competition between hardware/software platforms in the 32/64-bit video game console market

The effects of indirect network effects on market-share tipping and concentration, including the roles of consumer and firm beliefs

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Publication Date
2010-02-17
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Authors
Pradeep K. Chintagunta
Jean‐Pierre Dubé
Günter J. Hitsch
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