Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Экстенсиональное и интуитивное рассуждение: ошибка конъюнкции при оценке вероятности.
1983-10-01
SCID: 54.1/69e8eg9g
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availability heuristicconjunction fallacyconjunction ruleprobability judgmentrepresentativeness heuristic
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Abstract (AI)
Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction, P (A&B) cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P (A) and P (B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of its constituents. Judgments under uncertainty, however, are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule. A conjunction can be more representative than one of its constituents, and instances of a specific category can be easier to imagine or to retrieve than instances of a more inclusive category. The representativeness and availability heuristics therefore can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a variety of contexts including estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical prognosis, decision under risk, suspicion of criminal acts, and political forecasting. Systematic violations of the conjunction rule are observed in judgments of lay people and of experts in both between-subjects and within-subjects comparisons. Alternative interpretations of the conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it are explored.
Key Findings
1
Conjunction-rule violations occur across diverse domains, including word-frequency estimation, personality judgment, medical prognosis, risky decisions, criminal suspicion, and political forecasting.
2
Representativeness and availability heuristics can make a conjunction seem more probable than one of its constituents, producing the conjunction fallacy.
3
Systematic conjunction fallacies are observed among both laypeople and experts in both between-subjects and within-subjects comparisons.
4
The conjunction rule requires P(A&B) to be no greater than P(A) or P(B), because the conjunction’s possibility set is contained within each constituent’s set.
5
The paper examines alternative interpretations of the conjunction fallacy and evaluates attempts to reduce or prevent it.
Research Object
Human probability judgments under uncertainty, including laypeople's and experts' judgments across frequency estimation, personality judgment, medical prognosis, risky decision-making, criminal suspicion, and political forecasting
Research Subject
The conjunction fallacy: violations of the conjunction rule and the roles of representativeness and availability heuristics in making conjunctions seem more probable than their constituents
Publication Details
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1983-10-01
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