RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS

Рациональный выбор и фрейминг решений
Amos Tversky, Daniel J. Kahneman
1988-10-28

decision making under riskdescriptive decision theoryframing of decisionsnormative decision modelrational choice theory
The modern theory of decision making under risk emerged from a logical analysis of games of chance rather than from a psychological analysis of risk and value. The theory was conceived as a normative model of an idealized decision maker, not as a description of the behavior of real people. In Schumpeter's words, it “has a much better claim to being called a logic of choice than a psychology of value” (1954, p. 1058). The use of a normative analysis to predict and explain actual behavior is defended by several arguments. First, people are generally thought to be effective in pursuing their goals, particularly when they have incentives and opportunities to learn from experience. It seems reasonable, then, to describe choice as a maximization process. Secondly, competition favors rational individuals and organizations. Optimal decisions increase the chances of survival in a competitive environment, and a minority of rational individuals can sometimes impose rationality on the whole market. Thirdly, the intuitive appeal of the axioms of rational choice makes it plausible that the theory derived from these axioms should provide an acceptable account of choice behavior. The thesis of the present article is that, in spite of these a priori arguments, the logic of choice does not provide an adequate foundation for a descriptive theory of decision making. We argue that the deviations of actual behavior from the normative model are too widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random error, and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the normative system.
1
Modern decision theory under risk originated as a logical, normative model of idealized choice rather than a psychological description of real behavior.
2
Normative rational-choice theory is defended as behaviorally predictive because people can learn, incentives promote effective goal pursuit, and competition favors rational decisions.
3
Observed deviations from rational-choice predictions are widespread, systematic rather than random, and too fundamental to be explained by merely relaxing the normative axioms.
4
The abstract argues that normative logic does not adequately ground a descriptive theory of decision making.

human decision making under risk

systematic and fundamental deviations of actual choice behavior from the normative rational-choice model

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1988-10-28
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Amos Tversky
Daniel J. Kahneman
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