The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice

Фрейминг решений и психология выбора
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky
1981-01-30

decision framingpreference reversalprospect theorypsychology of choicerational choice
The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.
1
Dependence of preferences on problem formulation poses a significant challenge to theories of rational choice.
2
Framing effects cause preference reversals in choices involving both hypothetical and real monetary outcomes.
3
Preference reversals also occur in decisions concerning losses of human lives.
4
The influence of framing on preferences is compared with how perspective changes perceptual appearance.
5
The way decision problems are framed produces predictable shifts in preferences, even when the underlying options are equivalent.

Decision problems (choices presented in different frames involving monetary outcomes and life-loss scenarios)

Framing-dependent perception, probability and outcome evaluation, and preference reversals

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Publication Date
1981-01-30
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Authors
Daniel Kahneman
Amos Tversky
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