Collective Epistemic Virtues
Коллективные эпистемические добродетели
2007-07-01
SCID: 54.1/s8bxs8mu
Discuss with AI
Margaret Gilbertcollective beliefscollective epistemic virtuessocial epistemologyvirtue epistemology
Figures from the paper
Abstract (AI)
At the intersection of social and virtue epistemology lies the important, yet so far entirely neglected, project of articulating the social dimensions of epistemic virtues. Perhaps the most obvious way in which epistemic virtues might be social is that they may be possessed by social collectives. We often speak of groups as if they could instantiate epistemic virtues. It is tempting to think of these expressions as ascribing virtues not to the groups themselves, but to their members. Adapting Margaret Gilbert’s arguments against individualist accounts of collective beliefs, I show that individualist accounts of group virtues are either too weak or too strong. I then formulate a non‐individualist account modeled after Gilbert’s influential account of collective beliefs. A crucial disanalogy between collective traits and beliefs, I argue, makes the success of this model unlikely. I conclude with some questions with which the future work on collective epistemic virtues should engage.
Key Findings
1
A crucial disanalogy between collective traits and collective beliefs makes the proposed non-individualist model unlikely to succeed.
2
It argues that individualist accounts of group virtues are either too weak or too strong, adapting Margaret Gilbert’s critique of individualist accounts of collective beliefs.
3
The paper concludes by identifying questions that future research on collective epistemic virtues should address.
4
The paper develops a non-individualist account of collective epistemic virtues modeled on Gilbert’s theory of collective beliefs.
5
The paper identifies the social dimensions of epistemic virtues as a neglected research area, focusing on whether collectives can possess such virtues.
Research Object
epistemic virtues possessed or instantiated by social collectives (groups)
Research Subject
the social and non-individualist nature of collective epistemic virtues, including whether they can be attributed to groups rather than their individual members
Publication Details
Publication Date
2007-07-01
Journal
Publisher
ISSN
Cited by
126
Access Type
Author Information
Download PDF
Subscribe to digest