Competitive Authoritarianism

Конкурентный авторитаризм
Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way
2010-08-16

coercive party structurescompetitive authoritarianismdemocratizationexternal democratizing pressureties to the West
Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.
1
Study of 35 cases (1990–2008) shows external ties to the West determined competitive authoritarian outcomes.
2
When incumbents had developed, cohesive coercive party structures they could thwart opposition and competitive authoritarian regimes survived.
3
When incumbents lacked strong organizational tools, regimes were unstable but still rarely transitioned to democracy.
4
Where social, economic, and technocratic Western ties were extensive, incumbents ceded power rather than cracked down, leading to democratization.
5
Where ties to the West were limited, weaker external democratizing pressure meant countries rarely democratized.

Competitive authoritarian regimes (1990–2008) in 35 cases across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia

Determinants of regime outcomes — democratization versus survival — focusing on external ties to the West and internal state/party organizational characteristics (cohesive coercive party structures) that enable incumbents to cede power or suppress opposition

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2010-08-16
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Authors
Steven Levitsky
Lucan A. Way
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