Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
Сравнительная организация экономической деятельности: анализ дискретных структурных альтернатив
1991-06-01
SCID: 54.1/qx9v5rge
Discuss with AI
comparative economic organizationcontract lawinstitutional economicsmarket-hybrid-hierarchy formstransaction cost economics
Figures from the paper
Abstract (AI)
Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'
Key Findings
1
Each organizational form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law.
2
Market, hybrid, and hierarchical arrangements differ systematically in their capacities to adapt to disturbances.
3
The cost-effective organizational choice varies systematically with transaction attributes.
4
The framework unifies institutional environment and governance by modeling environmental parameters as determinants of comparative governance costs, including property rights, contract law, reputation, and uncertainty.
5
The paper distinguishes three generic organizational forms—market, hybrid, and hierarchy—using their different coordination and control mechanisms.
Research Object
generic forms of economic organization—market, hybrid, and hierarchy
Research Subject
comparative coordinating and control mechanisms, adaptive capacities, contract-law foundations, and transaction-cost performance as functions of transaction attributes and institutional parameters
Publication Details
Publication Date
1991-06-01
Journal
Publisher
ISSN
Cited by
8920
Access Type
Author Information
Download PDF
Subscribe to digest
References available in scid.ai4
Cited by17
The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead2000
The resource‐based view within the conversation of strategic management1992
Learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances: building relational capital2000
Ambiguity and the process of knowledge transfer in strategic alliances1999
Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms2000
Strategy research: governance and competence perspectives1999
Theory and research in strategic management: Swings of a pendulum1999
A dynamic capabilities-based entrepreneurial theory of the multinational enterprise2014
Explaining interfirm cooperation and performance: toward a reconciliation of predictions from the resource-based view and organizational economics1999
Real options theory in strategic management2016
Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization2021
The Economics and Sociology of Management Consulting2006
Transaction Cost Economics As a Theory of Supply Chain Efficiency2020
An Introduction to Polycentricity and Governance2019
Foundational Aspects of Polycentric Governance: Overarching Rules, Social-Problem Characteristics, and Heterogeneity2019
Polycentric Governing and Polycentric Governance2023
Complexity and Hybrid Public Administration—Theoretical and Empirical Challenges2010