Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives

Сравнительная организация экономической деятельности: анализ дискретных структурных альтернатив
Oliver E. Williamson
1991-06-01

comparative economic organizationcontract lawinstitutional economicsmarket-hybrid-hierarchy formstransaction cost economics
Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'
1
Each organizational form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law.
2
Market, hybrid, and hierarchical arrangements differ systematically in their capacities to adapt to disturbances.
3
The cost-effective organizational choice varies systematically with transaction attributes.
4
The framework unifies institutional environment and governance by modeling environmental parameters as determinants of comparative governance costs, including property rights, contract law, reputation, and uncertainty.
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The paper distinguishes three generic organizational forms—market, hybrid, and hierarchy—using their different coordination and control mechanisms.

generic forms of economic organization—market, hybrid, and hierarchy

comparative coordinating and control mechanisms, adaptive capacities, contract-law foundations, and transaction-cost performance as functions of transaction attributes and institutional parameters

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1991-06-01
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Oliver E. Williamson
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